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Abstract 
 
Efficient market models cannot explain the high level of trading in financial 
markets in terms of asset portfolio adjustment. It is presumed that much of 
this excessive trading is irrational ‘noise’ trading. A corollary is that there must 
either be irrational traders in the market or rational traders with irrational 
aberrations. The paper reviews the various attempts to explain noise trading 
in the finance literature concluding that the persistence of irrationality is not 
well explained.  Data from a study of 118 traders in four large investment 
banks are presented to advance reasons why traders might seek to trade 
more frequently than financial models predict. The argument is advanced that 
trades do not simply occur in order to generate profit, but it does not follow 
that such trading is irrational. Trading may generate information, accelerate 
learning, create commitments and enhance social capital, all of which sustain 
traders’ long term survival in the market.  The paper treats noise trading as a 
form of operational risk facing firms operating in financial markets and 
discusses approaches to the management of such risk. 
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 Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the management of 
risk taking behaviour by firms operating in financial markets. It focuses on a 
widespread and poorly explained phenomenon – the volume of trading in 
financial markets.  This volume is much higher than economic models predict; 
in such models it appears as irrational noise trading.  We argue that an 
analysis grounded in an understanding of trader behaviour within firms in 
financial markets assists understanding of the phenomenon and we provide 
data from a field study of traders in support of this argument. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
analysis of irrationality in financial markets. Section 3 looks specifically at the 
noise trading literature. Section 4 outlines our methods and data collection 
techniques. Section 5 presents the data and findings. Section 6 discusses the 
broader implications of the study for organisational management of risk. 
 
1. Analysing Markets 
 
The growth in scale and influence of financial markets has been accompanied 
by the rise of financial economics as an academic sub-discipline, particularly 
within business schools. The discipline is characterised by mathematically 
rigorous analysis of markets that are assumed to be relatively free of 
imperfections. Markets arise naturally, operate efficiently and adjust 
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instantaneously to new information; profit opportunities are fleeting and 
investors rational.  
 
The core proposition is Fama’s [1970; 1991] efficient markets hypothesis, the 
essence of which is that asset prices reflect all available information. In his 
later review he summarises the three forms of the hypothesis as follows 
“(1) weak-form tests (How well do past returns predict future 
returns?), (2) semi-strong-form tests (How quickly do security prices 
reflect public information announcements?), and (3) strong-form tests 
(Do any investors have private information that is not fully reflected 
in market prices?) [1991; 1576] 
 
Investors are assumed to be rational, and to trade on publicly available 
information. Imperfections in the market occur, but are quickly removed by 
arbitrage, in which traders spot anomalies in pricing and take profit in 
removing them.  
 
 
The elegance of the proposition and its explanatory power across a range of 
market phenomena have not immunised it from assault by those who observe 
irrationality in financial markets. Indeed, the detection and explanation of such 
irrationality is the core of the behavioural finance project. Excess volatility 
[Schiller; 1981], overreaction to news [De Bondt and Thaler;1987] and 
speculative bubbles [Schiller, 2000]  are examples of phenomena addressed 
by using psychological literature on cognitive biases and heuristics to address 
anomalies eluding explanation by the efficient markets hypothesis.  The 
approach generally taken by behavioural finance academics is to identify an 
apparent anomaly at the aggregate market level, for example over-trading of 
specific stocks, then attribute it to the widespread activation across the trading 
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population of individual cognitive biases, for example the representativeness 
heuristic, or overconfidence [Odean 1999; Barber, Odean and Zhu 2003] 
 
At its worst, this form of sampling on the dependent variable simply produces 
a list of anomalies to which a convenient cognitive bias is attached [e.g. 
Shefrin, 2000]. The process of aggregation by which individual heuristics 
become collective market phenomena is not generally addressed. The 
distribution and timing of anomalies cannot easily be predicted. Although the 
evidence of irrationality in markets is by now impressive, the behavioural 
finance literature has yet to develop a theory of irrationality – what finance 
academics term ‘investor sentiment’ – to displace the efficient markets 
hypothesis. As a result, the efficient markets hypothesis remains a key part of 
mainstream financial economics. However, as we attempt to show below, its 
concepts of rationality and irrationality are, respectively, narrow and very 
broad, and activities which sociologically or psychologically might be depicted 
as rational fall without the economic definition. 
 
As Shliefer [2000;1-28] notes, by itself the presence of irrationality does not 
particularly undermine the efficient markets hypothesis in its weak form. It is 
after all concerned with the behaviour of prices, not investors.  Irrational 
investors may enter and even persist in markets but for this to undermine 
even the weak form of Fama’s proposition two rather strong conditions must 
be fulfilled. First, investor irrationality must be intercorrelated, thus having a 
directional impact on asset prices away from underlying value; individual 
traders are unlikely to affect asset prices generally, but if they act according to 
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shared biases, they may. Second, there must be a scarcity of exploitable 
arbitrage opportunities preventing rational investors in the market from making 
profit from irrationality by eradicating price anomalies.  Empirical evidence 
consistent with the existence of these conditions – such as the dot com boom 
– abounds but the theory of investor sentiment and the model of arbitrage 
scarcity which might fully explain it do not. 
 
Building a [behavioural] theory of investor sentiment out of the cognitive 
biases literature is in fact a daunting task.  That literature itself contains few 
propositions not inferred from experimental evidence and no overarching 
theory of decision making. Incidence and sources of variation of particular 
heuristics are not well addressed. Perhaps as a consequence, much of the 
best work in behavioural finance, such as Odean’s [1998] work connecting 
loss aversion to reluctance to sell falling stocks, relies on a rather simplistic 
crowd psychology to underpin the mathematical elegance. 
 
Arguably, the more recent literature on the sociology of financial markets is 
making better progress in providing grounded explanations of trader 
behaviour. Early work by Baker [1984a and b] explained volatility in pit trading 
in terms of the elaboration of social networks and Abolafia’s [1996] 
ethnographic work in bond and equity markets indicated the relationship 
between use of particular decision heuristics and features of market 
operation.  In both cases, apparent irrationality is seen to be rooted in the 
pattern of trading interactions in the market. More recently, in the analysis of 
market institutions, MacKenzie and Millo [2003] have illustrated the operation 
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of social forces and their impact on market prices. In the analysis of the 
Chicago financial derivatives exchange, they show the “performativity” of 
financial economic theory; i.e. use of the Black-Scholes-Merton pricing 
formula by traders caused derivative prices to converge on its predictions and 
‘helped make one of its own key assumptions – that stocks could be 
purchased entirely on credit – true’.  In the analysis of the demise of Long 
Term Capital Management, MacKenzie [2003] is able to elaborate a sociology 
of arbitrage in which processes of imitation generate an irrational flight from 
attractive arbitrage opportunities. A key insight here, and indeed in Abolafia’s 
work, is the reflexivity of financial markets. Actors are aware of and trained in 
the tools of financial economics and the use of such tools itself conditions 
market outcomes. 
 
The early sociological work dealt primarily with face-to face trading. Given the 
evidence that electronic trading has an impact on trading behaviour, 
particularly trading frequency [Choi et al, 2000], sociological analysis of 
electronic markets – which now dominate equity and bond transactions – is 
important. Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger [2002] paint a picture of disembodied 
transactions in foreign exchange markets which constitute a dematerialised 
virtual society nonetheless subject to certain general transactional norms. 
However, focusing on the firm rather than the market, Beunza and Stark 
[2004] use similar ethnographic techniques to paint a very different picture of 
how arbitrage strategies may emerge through repeated face to face 
conversations within firms to be subsequently exercised in electronic market 
transactions. Study of the complicated relationship between large firms which 
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dominate market transactions and the global electronic networks which 
sustain them is absent from the behavioural finance literature but key to 
understanding market behaviour. We develop this point in more detail below. 
 
Focusing directly on market prices, Zaloom [2003] paints a very different 
description of price perceptions from the simple ‘price-taking’ approach of the 
efficient markets hypothesis.  Rather than seeing prices as unproblematic 
conveyers of information, her ethnography of London and Chicago foreign 
exchange traders depicts a process in which market actors “search out social 
information contained within the bid and ask prices that anchor their 
knowledge of the market”. Prices in this view are quantitative information 
fronting deeply embedded social information. Traders look at prices in order to 
discover “social reasons for the movement of the market” – this involves 
“crafting” the identity and motivations of market competitors [2003; 261, 264.] 
 
In summary, then, financial markets do not operate as arenas for transactions 
underpinned by unbounded rationality. Apparent irrationality exists and it 
appears to affect market outcomes. In explaining it, one may seek to fit 
market anomalies to the operation of decision biases; to the extent that the 
source and distribution of such decision biases remains elusive, 
understanding is limited and prediction is difficult. One may try to understand 
financial markets as social institutions, fundamentally transactional in nature, 
but within which traders operate reflexively under bounded rationality and 
subject to organisational constraints.  We deploy this approach below to the 
study of noise trading.  
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3.  Noise 
 
As Dow and Gorton [1997; 1025-6] note ‘there appears to be a consensus 
that trading volume or turnover (trading volume as a fraction of total market 
value) is inexplicably high’. A very large proportion of transactions 
[approximately 75%] are inter-bank transactions. This is problematic; under 
assumptions of rationality, trading should take place primarily when investors 
seek to adjust their portfolios. Participants in the market are trading when they 
should not, and thus exposing themselves to risk. They may be doing so for 
hedging or liquidity reasons [i.e. rationally], or they may be economically 
irrational, i.e. guided by sentiment or reasoning not related to material trading 
outcomes.  
 
We have chosen to focus on noise for several reasons. First, it is pervasive in 
bond and equity markets. Second, because so much of it appears to involve 
inter bank transactions, we can see it as an organisational as much as a 
market phenomenon; banks or their agents engaged in noise trading are 
indulging their appetites for gain and their willingness to bear risks to do so.  
Third – and most important – conventional finance theory finds this pervasive 
market phenomenon difficult to explain and this failure illuminates certain 
limitations of the concept of rationality embedded in the efficient markets 
hypothesis. 
 
Black originated the term ‘noise’ to describe this excess trading. He remarks 
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“People who trade on noise are willing to trade even though from an 
objective point of view they would be better off not trading. Perhaps 
they think the noise they are trading on is information. Or perhaps they 
just like to trade [1986; 531]. 
It is worth noting that in this early formulation, noise trading may arise either 
from error or from sensation seeking; we return to this below. 
 
Noise trading is perhaps the most pervasive example of apparently 
intercorrelated irrationality in financial markets. It has generated a 
considerable literature in both mainstream and behavioural finance literatures. 
We argue here that they do not sum to an adequate explanation of the 
phenomenon.  
 
 There have been several approaches. Friedman [1953] classically depicted 
noise traders as a transient naïve presence in markets who would buy high 
and sell low, so disappearing over time.  By contrast, in his argument Black is 
in addition suggesting that trading activity might itself enter the utility function 
of any or all traders as a source of enjoyment, particularly where profits are 
being made  [1986, 533]. He goes on to remark that if things like enjoyment of 
trading go into the utility function very little of expected utility theory can be 
salvaged. Dow and Gorton [1997] argue that noise trading exists because 
investors [principals] force traders [agents] to trade rather than be idle; the 
latter find it difficult to justify actively doing nothing.  It is thus a feature of 
agency in the market and thus by implication a feature of the behaviour of 
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informed agents, typically in investment banks, rather than simply naïve 
principals.  
 
This third approach roots noise trading in a specific institutional feature of the 
market- the presence of agent traders in large firms. Given the volume of inter 
bank transactions, the Dow and Gorton approach addresses the possibility 
that noise may be generated by sophisticated agents in large investment 
banks. In fact, in this approach noise trading is both a source of operational 
risk rooted in agent behaviour from the point of view of the firm, and a source 
of liquidity in the markets with possible welfare benefits. When traders trade 
on noise, either the bank’s funds or those of its customers incur unnecessary 
risk. 
 
 From these three examples it is clear that we may have at least three 
different conceptions of the sources of noise trading; they are not mutually 
exclusive. First, noise trading  emerges from a continuous supply of naïve 
traders entering the market, second, it rests in sensation seeking propensities 
to which perhaps all traders are potentially prone, third, it is a market 
distortion ultimately attributable to the presence of firms in which agency 
relationships arise. In addition, there have been two units of analysis in the 
finance literature on noise; first, noise traders as individuals, depicted as an 
irrational segment of the market and, second, noise trading as an activity, 
depicted as an aggregate market phenomenon.   
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Explaining noise has proved intractable. The traditional approach to the 
“irrational segment” argument was that such irrational traders would be 
inefficient and disappear. However, more recent approaches take a more 
radical view. De Long et al [1990] argue, first, that noise traders are irrational, 
having ‘erroneous stochastic beliefs’. Second, irrationality helps, in that the 
additional risk associated with it may generate higher expected returns than 
those accruing to rational traders. Third, the rational traders’ reaction to 
irrationality may cause prices to diverge from fundamental values.   Shliefer 
and Summers [1990; 26, 28-9] take the point about arbitrageurs reaction 
further, arguing that where arbitrageurs pick stock, bet on mood swings, or 
engage in positive feedback trading strategies, then “it becomes hard to tell 
the noise traders from the arbitrageurs” both may be “feeding the bubble” 
[1990; 26] Since prices are affected and there are positive returns to 
irrationality, little of the efficient markets hypothesis remains here.   
 
If, as Black argues in the second approach, noise is about sensation-seeking, 
then clearly we need something other than the efficient market hypothesis to 
explain it. However, the approach taken here is that sensation seeking is only 
one of the irrational – in finance terms – motives one might wish to examine in 
order to explain the empirical volume of trades – we return to this below. 
 
The third approach, seeing noise as the outcome of the behaviour of 
sophisticated agents behaving [as agents] rationally locates it as a property of 
significant market institutions rather than the market periphery but the model 
Dow and Gorton present is both simple and provocative. It is simple in that 
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their model posits that the agent cannot convince the principal that any 
inactivity is positive and thus must noise trade hoping to produce returns by 
chance [1997;1029]. It is provocative in that the implied outcome, that 
principals will be risk neutral but agents risk-seeking, runs contrary to the 
conventional assumptions of agency theory which see agents as risk averse 
[Jensen and Meckling 1976]. In fact, modifications to agency theory which we 
discuss below have developed more contingency-based models which 
elaborate the circumstances in which risk aversion and risk-seeking by agents 
may be predicted [Wiseman and Gomez-Meija, 1998]. It is possible that 
certain types of agency might have a greater propensity to encourage noise 
trading than others and thus that the organisation’s choice of agency 
arrangements might have an impact on exposure to this form of operational 
risk. 
 
If there are in fact two additive social processes – naïveté among 
unsophisticated principals and accountability noise among sophisticated 
agents – we may be on the way to grounding the origins of excessive trading 
in the variable social structures of markets. However, given the dominance of 
institutional investors in bond and equity markets and the volume of trading 
generated it is likely that noise trading is an organisational as much as a 
market phenomenon and that in order to understand it, simple concepts of 
investor error will not do. 
  
Recent sociological work on agent traders in financial markets does point the 
way towards an explanation of the sources of noise trading, without being 
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specifically concerned with it as a market outcome. It does so by isolating 
social processes within markets which might encourage participants to trade. 
We isolate four interrelated processes for discussion here; learning, 
information search, reciprocity and network building. All, we argue, are rooted 
in sociological features of the market. All might encourage apparently 
irrational risk taking behaviour in the short term as part of a long term market 
survival strategy.  
 
Previous work on financial markets has suggested all such processes exist. 
Abolafia [1996; 26] notes that the intuitive processes central to trader 
performance are built up through ‘trial and error experience’. Beunza and 
Stark [2004; 371] refer to traders ‘conducting experiments to test the market’. 
Much of the information traders have or are seeking to access is tacit and 
quasi-proprietary in that other traders are seeking to protect it [Willman et al, 
2001; Zaloom, 2003]. Simple information requests are both difficult and 
unreliable in electronic markets and the test of many intuitive and embryonic 
trading strategies can only be a trade. Much information is available on 
screens in sophisticated trading rooms and immense amounts of computing 
power are available to simulate trading outcomes, but as Beunza and Stark 
note, in configuring the screen content, traders’ own assumptions become 
part of this decision support. Moreover, as one of Abolafia’s respondents 
[1996;24] notes, “you need to know what people think the information means” 
and for this some form of interaction is necessary.  Noise trading may 
represent a cost of learning through market testing; put another way a cost of 
using the price mechanism may be price testing incurring transaction costs. 
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Abolafia also [1996; 176] notes that “norms of exchange and reputations for 
trustworthiness” emerge in markets.  Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger note that 
seekers of information in particular must also be givers as traders “transmit 
and amplify signals of reciprocity” and while “all traders will be watching the 
same events and one another …. some also interact [trade] and in doing so 
implement a new level of signalling and responsiveness” [Knorr-Cetina and 
Bruegger, 2002; 925, 927].  This sense of reciprocity in markets is reinforced 
by codes of practice. In international foreign exchange markets, for example, 
they note that, if asked for a price, traders are expected to quote and, if you 
quote you are expected to commit to the quoted price if the counterparty 
wishes to trade. Conversely, traders are expected to offer deals on completion 
of price requests; failure to act after information search can lead to exclusion 
from information sources. 
 
All of this generates and sustains access to networks. Baker’s classic pit-
trading work illustrates the relationship between network membership and 
trading frequency. Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger [2002; 933] observe that even 
in electronic markets ‘information conversations are the means for the building 
and maintaining of relationships’. And membership has its benefits. Access to 
links to important actors allow traders to track the market – privileged 
information becomes available. From this perspective, noise trading risk is the 
cost of information access. 
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Certain trading strategies may be associated with noise trades. Zaloom [2003; 
267] describes the operation of ‘Spoofers’ who generate large quantities of 
bids and asks in order to exaggerate levels demand and supply and so move 
the market. In turn, tailgating a Spoofer could be a profit making strategy by 
tracking the movement of the market. In the culture of the foreign exchange 
markets she studied, ‘taking out’ a Spoofer by calling his bluff generated 
reputational returns. 
 
We can now return to the conventional finance theory views of noise.  Noise 
trades should not take place if market actors are rational hence it is a term 
used to describe irrationality. However, agent traders and those who track 
market movements made by noise traders may be, in different ways, 
behaving rationally in noise trading.  The origins of noise trading remain 
elusive and, in practice, the term is used as a ‘dumping’ concept to describe 
the considerable volume of trading activity the efficient markets approach 
cannot explain. Neither noise trading nor noise traders are coherently defined 
categories, they are simply different approaches to a large residual 
inexplicable in terms of a sociologically rather thin market conception. The 
behavioural finance project does not move us far from this; it simply adds 
sociologically unanchored heuristics to fit observed and anomalous aggregate 
trading patterns. Temporal and interpersonal sources of variation in the 
incidence of heuristic-based trading cannot be explained. 
 
Sociological work on financial markets, however, allows a focus on how 
individuals in markets both reflexively make sense of their circumstances and 
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also seek profit opportunities. It leads to identification of a number of social 
processes which might generate trading for reasons other than portfolio 
adjustment, liquidity or hedging. They have in common that the returns from 
trading are not measured solely by the return on the trade itself but in terms 
their contribution to the intellectual and social capital of market participants 
and thus are more likely to be indulged in by those who intend to trade in the 
longer term.  
 
Noise trading risk is a behavioural component of the operating risk faced by 
investment banks. Power [2003; 2] has noted the close relationship [albeit, 
perhaps in retrospect] between the rise of the concept of operational risk and 
the behaviour of traders in financial markets – particularly Nick Leeson. 
Operational risk in investment banks is defined as “the risk of direct or indirect 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events [Power 2003; 7]. This is a peculiar notion of 
risk for investment banking for two reasons. First, it focuses on loss rather 
then variability of outcome; investment banks usually analyse both upside and 
downside. Second, as Power notes, it tends to be concerned with high impact 
low probability events. We argue that noise trading is a behavioural 
component of operational risk which arises because of the looseness of 
internal control processes on traders. However, since traders engage in noise 
trades to improve long term market performance, it has both upside and 
downside and their may be in principal an ‘optimal’ exposure to this form of 
risk in which the long term benefits exceed short-term losses. Second, we 
argue from the volume of noise trading that it is endemic rather than a low 
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probability event. We will return in conclusion to discuss some of the practical 
implications of this view. First, we provide some background on the sample 
and approach, and present our data. 
 
 
4.  Methods and Data   
 
The data presented here are extracted from a wider research project that 
considered individual and organisational influences on trader performance 
[Fenton O’Creevy et al, 2005]. Four London offices of major investment banks 
participated in the research. Three were American owned and one was 
European. Equity and bond trading, and the trading of derivatives of those 
products, were the focus of this study. All participants conducted their trading 
electronically. No open-outcry markets were involved.  Participants were 
traders and their managers. The sample comprised 118 traders and trader-
managers who completed a range of measures, outlined below, and 10 senior 
managers who participated only in the management interview section of the 
data collection process.   
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all respondents.  Interviews 
addressed a range of issues, including motivations, emotions, trading 
strategies, and questions about organisational culture. They also included 
questions about control, incentives and management style, and the 
experience of gain and loss. Interviews averaged 1 hour in duration; they 
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were taped and transcripts produced.  The qualitative data presented here are 
based on analysis of the content of these transcripts. i 
 
The approach to analysis was phenomenological, although some references 
are made to whether a type of comment reflected a majority opinion or not. 
Interview data were coded for analysis using the QSR NUD*IST Vivo (NVivo) 
program. The program enables sections of transcribed interview text to be 
coded and categorised. Each interview transcript was coded into categories 
developed to represent the key areas of interest in this paper using NVivo. 
 
In addition we collected a range of quantitative data. First, participants 
completed a questionnaire covering a range of demographic data such as age 
and length of service and remuneration data [see Appendix 1]. Second, we 
asked participants to complete the NEO-PIR personality instrument, a widely 
used "Big Five" personality instrument [Costa and MCrae 1992; Digman 
1997].  We did this in order to explore relationships between personality and 
risk behaviours. Third, illusion of control, a common source of cognitive bias, 
was measured by a computer-based task [see Fenton-O’Creevy et al 2003]. 
We were concerned to explore relationships between overconfidence and 
trading performance, given the salience of this issue in the behavioural 
finance literature [e.g. Odean 1999] 
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5. Results 
 
Our approach to data presentation is as follows. First, we look at the nature of 
the agency relationship. We focus particularly on monitoring and incentives, 
showing the scope for agent noise trading and the circumstances which make 
it most likely. Second, we focus on specific circumstances which might 
encourage unnecessary trading; extremes of activity and inactivity appear 
important. Third, we look at specific trader characteristics, arguing that there 
may be individual differences in propensity to trade. 
 
Traders were employed on permanent contracts. Job tenure was between 6 
months and 30 years (M = 6.7, SD = 4.8). Years trading experience ranged 
from 6 months to 27 years (M = 5.1 yrs, SD = 4.15). There were minor 
differences between institutions but in general traders worked as part of 
loosely monitored teams [“desks”] focusing on particular trading instruments 
or sectors.  Managers were generally ex-traders who operated with wide 
spans of control. Details of incentives differed between the four firms, but two 
features were common; the basic financial calculation, and the timing.  
 
The calculative formula was a hierarchical system taking into account 
organisation, team and then individual performance. This formula was well 
known to the traders interviewed. However, each manager interviewed was 
asked to provide information concerning bonus calculation, and none were 
forthcoming with a specific procedure. In practice, there was latitude for 
variation both within and across organisations. Issues that could influence 
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bonus-setting were contributions to the team, information sharing, standards 
of customer care and exposure to risk. The precise calculations of bonuses 
were unstandardised and individual with varying degrees of weight placed 
upon team and individual factors. The lack of clarity led some traders to 
develop trading strategies, which included risk exposure, based upon inferred 
hypotheses regarding payment calculations. 
 
The second important characteristic of the bonus process was the timing of 
decisions. The organisations in this study completed bonus calculations 
before the end of the trading year: for example, in September when the 
trading year ended on December 31. Some traders perceived this as an 
opportunity to shift their strategy either towards taking more risk, or less. In 
total, 61% of the traders interviewed reported significant changes to their 
strategy over the course of the trading year. The managers in the sample 
were aware of the potential for traders’ strategies to change, and reported that 
there were no significant problems associated with the bonus cycle. 
Moreover, it was recognised that this cycle is the industry standard and there 
could be first mover disadvantages association with making large scale 
changes to the process. There was wide earnings variation within the sample, 
from under £100,000 per annum to well over £500,000ii.  Over half of the 
sample earned over £300,000 per annum [in 2000] 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 summarises our findings on monitoring and incentives [see Willman 
et al 2002].  We discovered in interview that managers monitored trading 
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when they knew losses were occurring but granted considerable autonomy 
when traders were in profit. This is consistent with a tolerance of risk aversion 
in the domain of gains, but a concern with the avoidance of risk-seeking loss 
aversion if trades went sour [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979].  Based solely on 
this intervention pattern, traders will not maximise returns but will minimise 
losses. The discipline of traders who are making money is the pursuit of 
bonus. Managers relied on traders pursuing profit - a share of which would 
accrue to them as agents - rather than intervening to ensure they maximised 
returns, a course of action from which they were prevented both by lack of 
detailed knowledge of trades and by extensive spans of control. 
 
Two particular areas of managerial concern were in the zone 0B and the area 
above A. In the former case, managers were concerned directly to intervene 
in trades to minimise losses by directing the closure of positions. The distance 
0B [i.e. the extent to which risk taking loss aversion occurred] is thus an 
inverse measure of managerial effectiveness. Above A, i.e. after traders had 
achieved their annual bonus targets, little discipline other than their own 
propensities for risk aversion or risk taking defined the number of trades a 
trader would engage in. This volume then depended on work conditions and 
individual differences; we look at these below. In short, any trader in our 
sample showing profit on trades and progress towards bonus target would 
have considerable opportunity to engage in experimental, educational or 
exciting trades in the course of a bonus year.  
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Towards the end of a bonus year, two pressures might cause increased 
trading volumes. The first is straightforward; traders falling short of their profit 
targets might engage in risky trades driven by loss aversion. The second is 
perhaps less intuitive. Although many traders who had hit bonus targets might 
become risk averse and avoid unnecessary trades, others appeared to 
envisage hitting the profit target as an opportunity for sensation seeking 
trades. 
 
‘Risk tolerance becomes infinite at the end of the year because we don’t have 
any personal exposure to our result in the last couple of months, we can 
almost become less discriminating in the trades we put on.’ 
 
‘I think there is a certain comfort factor from having made money- your 
willingness to lose it is probably slightly higher.’ 
 
Why, then, would traders choose to trade ‘too much’?  One option is that more 
frequent trading may follow from enthusiasm, of which there was considerable 
evidence. Traders were more likely to report trading more frequently when 
making money [and vice versa]. There were several examples.  
 
 “When I make money I think it shows I’m doing something right. If I’m right, I 
will try and do more of them, to increase the size of my position to make more 
money.” 
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“When you are getting things right, having a high hit ratio, then you can take a 
lot more risk. When you are losing money, you tend to think you are unlucky, 
but ultimately you are just getting it wrong” 
 
“I think if you are on a roll, that is when you are prepared to put more money 
at risk. When you are not sure what is going on and you have a few losses 
that is when you pull back.” 
 
“On average, people will trade more often when they are making money 
compared with when they are losing money because their risk aversion and 
loss tolerance change.” 
Others had belief about relationships between trading volume and success. 
 
“….turnover is usually important in my business. The more trades I do the 
better. If I do 1000 trades I’ll make more money than if I did 500 trades” 
 
However we had no hard data on the relationship between trading frequency, 
risk exposure and success. 
 
At the other extreme, it may be that excessive trading emerges from boredom, 
with trades initiated for essentially sensation-seeking purposes. One of our 
respondents described how boredom trades are generated. 
 
“You do boredom trades because you can be sitting up there doing nothing 
and you think, well I’ll do that because it gives me something to do. The next 
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thing you know you are wrong and you’ve lost money on it. Or you’re right and 
you’re inclined to do it again in bigger volumes.” 
 
“A boredom trade is where someone might ask you a price and.. you haven’t 
got anything to do , you don’t know and you think you’ll just sell for the hell of 
it and it proves costly” 
 
Patt and Zeckhauser [2000; 46]  identify “action bias” as “a general tendency 
towards action as a decision heuristic”.  They argue that it is likely in agency 
situations where imperfect monitoring occurs and also where individuals are 
seeking learning opportunities; they even identify “strong action bias” where 
individuals may prefer a combination of gains and losses to inaction.  Add the 
sensation-seeking argument, that traders like to trade, and one has a motor 
for increasing trading frequency in slow markets. 
 
I do enjoy risk. That’s part of what I do. Its part of the job. I mean if you’re not 
interested in taking risk then to be honest you’re probably in the wrong job. 
 
I thrive on taking risks in the sense that if the job I did didn’t entail taking risks 
I wouldn’t do it.  
 
Networking and information sharing were problematic for our respondents 
because of the tendency for traders to wish to create or protect private 
information 
 
“Everyone has the right to know arbitrage information, but people do not 
necessarily think it is their duty to share the information.”  
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“This business is not about team spirit. We should be better at trading as a 
group … but in reality people get very parochial and very protective of what 
they’re doing.” 
 
“If I didn’t know something and went and asked someone, this gives them 
bargaining power.” 
 
Perhaps because of this, traders also emphasised the importance of learning 
from experience. 
 
 “To trade anything well, you need at least a year’s experience of trading that 
stock.” 
 
“The year is a continuous progression of trading experiences.” 
 
“You can never know enough and you can never learn too much.” 
 
 
Several demographic factors influenced performance. Educational levels, 
tenure and trading experience are all positively associated with total earnings. 
Based on unstandardised regression coefficients, an increase of one 
educational level [e.g. from bachelors’ to masters’ degree] was associated 
with an increase in pay of £88,000 pa. An increase in tenure of one year is 
associated with a pay increase of £29,000 pa. An increase in experience of 
one year is associated with an increase of £19,000 pa. These characteristics 
of the ‘stock’ of traders in a firm may be important. If noise trading is partly 
about trading for learning, network building and information search, we might 
expect that more experienced traders would need to do less of it. We might 
also expect that traders who had been in the same job for some time might do 
less of it. There is some support in our data. If noise trading is inefficient, 
whatever its longer term functions, one would expect it to correlate negatively 
with performance outcomes. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
In addition, we collected data on personality and dispositions. Personality 
factors appear to account for significant variation in earnings. The NEO 
factors – neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness 
and conscientiousness are also included in Table 1.  If we accept total 
earnings as a proxy for trader performance, the results suggest that the higher 
performing traders in our sample are emotionally stable introverts who are 
open to experience. Given the small size of our sample of traders with 
personality data (N=64) we have to be cautious about generalising from this 
result. However, the pattern makes sense.  
 
The story would go as follows.  Emotional stability immunises individuals 
against the stresses and strains of a job that places a premium on maintaining 
detachment in the face of large gains and losses. Introversion insulates 
traders against social distractions including the need to be liked and accepted: 
useful especially where there is a need to seek or tolerate contrarian 
positions. Finally, openness is associated with intelligence and ability to adapt 
to fast changing environments. 
 
The Illusion of control is the tendency to act as if chance events are 
accessible to personal control (Langer, 1975). It has been found empirically to 
link with a tendency to perceive situations as less risky than they actually are 
(Houghton et al., 2000), and in consequence to take greater risks.   We find 
that it has a significant and negative impact on performance as measured by 
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remuneration [Table 1]. As reported elsewhere, we also found that it was 
negatively associated with managers rating of traders’ risk management and 
market analysis abilities [Fenton O’Creevy et al, 2004].  We argue that illusion 
of control is associated with overconfidence which in turn may lead to 
overtrading and underperformance. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
In Figure 2, we summarise our general findings.  Our analysis implies that in 
order to predict the level of noise trading in a given firm at a point in time, one 
would in addition to the market conditions need to look at both the 
characteristics of the stock of traders and the organisational control and 
incentive regimes to which they are subject [McNamara and Bromiley, 1997]. 
For an organisation operating within a market, noise trading risk can be 
reduced by paying attention to selection testing, monitoring [including training 
of managers] and rewards.  Any trading desk might be considered as a 
portfolio of operational risk defined by the personality and dispositions of 
traders on the one hand and the freedom to act on them on the other.  
 
An agency approach may not be sufficient in itself to explain excess trading in 
financial markets but it is certainly a necessary ingredient given the volume of 
such trades originating in large firms using trader agents. Dow and Gorton 
have a simple but at based limited model of the agency relationship as a risk 
generator in which agents are forced to act. Focusing on the risk bearing 
behaviour of agents who are not closely monitored and whose appetites for 
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risk may vary gives a richer picture. Large investment banks are complicated 
vehicles for the management of risk and the operation of heuristics but they 
do not appear as actors in much of the behavioural finance literature. Our 
argument is that the market anomalies which appear to generate risk 
behaviour incompatible with the efficient markets hypothesis – such as noise 
trading - may be better understood by analysing social relationships within the 
largest institutions in the market than by using individual biases as the sole 
unit of analysis.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Financial institutions are producers, processors and managers of risk.  Even 
their own risk management products – such as derivatives for hedging – 
become profit generating products and on occasion, as in the LTCM case, 
cause major problems. The pursuit of risk is the source of profit and the 
management of risk is concerned with the avoidance of loss.  
 
Financial institutions engage with risk by trading in markets.  These markets 
are global, virtual institutions involving great uncertainty. The traders are 
skilled organisational agents operating under loose controls and considerable 
incentives who seek to survive and profit by making sense of this market 
uncertainty, often by attaching meanings to observed price movements in a 
very short space of time.  One could, relying simply on the cognitive bias 
literature, argue that these organisational environments are from one 
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viewpoint factories for the manufacture of imperfect decision heuristics – 
confident experts acting under stress with the prospect of considerable gain 
and loss. However, to understand the incidence and distribution of these 
heuristics one needs to situate traders decision making within the 
organisational agency context.  
 
The existence of noise trading ostensibly shows large scale irrational risk 
taking operating in the market.  This is a form of operational risk for banks, but 
we have argued that for traders it is a necessary form of risk exposure. 
Frequent trading allows traders opportunities for learning, sensation seeking, 
information search and network building. However, to the extent that they 
trade in order to do this, they expose their firms to higher levels of operational 
risk. In consequence, in making decisions about how these traders are 
selected, monitored and rewarded financial institutions are in practice defining 
their own appetites for risk.  A portfolio of traders with differing risk 
propensities contains operational risk in approximately the same way as a 
portfolio of assets contains market risk. 
 
In our view, noise, in its financial economic sense of normatively irrational 
trading activity becomes a highly problematic concept once one takes a 
broader view of rationality. However, it has utility in at least two senses. First, 
if traders are trading for non-financial motives then they do bear risks in doing 
so and those risks accrue to the firms they work for. Second, if traders trade in 
pursuit of long term advantages then they bear risk in pursuit of those 
advantages and those risks need to be understood 
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What are the broader implications?  First, our approach sees organisations as 
risk makers as well as risk takers. In financial markets, large organisations 
make decisions which strongly influence the overall level of risk in the market.  
This may be true of other fields and emphasises the importance of using the 
organisation as a unit of analysis in the study of risk. Second, we have seen 
the nature of agency relationships within organisations as influencing the 
organisation’s risk appetite; were traders not on bonus, we would argue, 
financial markets might operate very differently.  Third, we have looked at the 
interaction between organisational controls and individual dispositions; this 
approach emphasises the role of individual differences in explaining risk 
behaviour, particularly in the spaces between the rules with which 
organisations seek to control risk. 
 
A trading environment consisting of organisations that both enable and control 
trading agents who operate with considerable autonomy to develop profit 
strategies in highly volatile environments is, we would argue, a more accurate 
picture of the mechanisms generating high trading volumes than imagining 
individuals failing to behave according to price-taking rationality.  Financial 
markets are empirically complicated social environments in which information 
is generated, decoded and used in a wider range of categories than ‘news’ 
and ‘noise’.  If we are to understand more fully the generation and 
management of trader risk in market environments, this richer and more 
complicated reality needs to be better understood. 
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Table 1 Regression on total remuneration 
 Standardised 
regression 
coefficients 
Experience1 .44 ** 
Job level2 .36 ** 
Education3 23  
Illusion of control -.28 * 
Neuroticism -.42 ** 
Extroversion -.28 * 
Openness .41 ** 
Agreeableness -.23  
Conscientiousness -.05  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. Job tenure in trading 
2. Levels to CEO in the London Office 
3. Highest qualification 
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 Figure 1: Introducing incentive and monitoring effects to prospect theory description of risk behaviour 
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Figure 2: Noise Risk Exposure 
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Appendix: Investment Bank Sample Profile 
 
Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D 
Total 
sample 
Sample size (N) 38 32 23 25 118 
Senior managers interviewed 3 1 5 1 10 
Age (mean years) 33.8 30.91 32.87 33.80 32.81 
Mean Job tenure (years)  6.18 6.11 4.74 10.08 6.71 
Mean Organisation tenure 
(years) 
7.18 6.67 6.57 11.30 7.80 
Traders 13 22 11 11 57 
Trader/managers 23 10 11 2 46 
Desk managers 2 0 1 12 15 
Male 38 31 22 25 116 
Female 0 1 1 0 2 
Education (highest qualification) (N) 
O-Level/GCSE 1 2 1 16 20 
A-Level 2 4 3 5 14 
HND/equivalent 1 3 2 0 6 
Degree 9 13 8 3 33 
Masters 16 6 6 1 29 
PhD 9 4 3 0 16 
Seniority: Levels to CEO in the London office  
1 3 6 1 3 13 
2 16 15 3 15 49 
3 15 7 9 3 34 
4 4 4 9 0 17 
5 0 0 1 2 3 
6 0 0 0 2 2 
Salary, including bonus for the year end prior to the study  
£50k –99k 0 3 1 0 4 
£100k – 299k 9 13 5 14 41 
£300k – 499k 7 6 12 9 34 
> £500k 21 10 5 2 38 
Not divulged 1 0 0 0 1 
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i The interview schedule is available from the first named author on request. 
 
ii  These data exclude stock options. 
 
